Is Job Insecurity the Hidden Driver of Japan's Low Birth Rate? Research Shows It Explains 45% Increase of Childless Men
The Triple Threat: Temporary Work, Unemployment, and Career Disruption
Japan's plunging birth rates have become a (well, more of a thought terminating cliché at this point) cautionary tale. New research, Decomposing delayed first marriage and birth across cohorts: The role of increased employment instability among men in Japan by Ryota Mugiyama, reveals a (not-so) surprising culprit: the rise of unstable employment among Japanese men. Here's what's happening and why it matters for societies worldwide.
The big picture: Japan's population crisis comes down to two interconnected trends
Men are waiting longer to get married — the average age jumped from 27 in 1990 to over 31 by 2015
Nearly 1 in 4 Japanese men now reach age 50 without ever marrying, up from just 1 in 20 in 1990
First births show the same delay pattern, as nearly all Japanese children are born within marriage
Unlike Western countries, alternatives like cohabitation or having children outside marriage remain rare
Why it matters
Japan is the most reference (sometimes unfairly considering a number of European countries have similar or even lower rates) what happens when traditional expectations about men as providers collide with modern economic insecurity. Similar patterns are emerging in South Korea, Europe, and increasingly in the United States.
How Japan's employment system works
Japan has a unique labor market that makes job stability particularly crucial:
"Regular employment" traditionally begins right after graduation through a structured hiring process
These coveted jobs offer lifetime employment, good benefits, and career advancement
"Nonstandard jobs" (part-time, contract, or temporary positions) provide little security, lower wages, and few benefits
The gap between these two tracks is stark — there's little mobility between them
By the numbers: Job instability explains a surprising amount of Japan's family delay
The research compared men born between 1945-1954 with those born 1975-1984 and found instability accounts for:
31% of the increase in never-married men at age 30
45% of the increase in childless men at age 30
26% of the overall drop in marriage rates across generations
27% of the decline in first birth rates
How job problems delay families
Three key employment issues have worsened across generations:
Rise of temporary work: The percentage of young men in nonstandard jobs jumped from 3% in 1990 to 15% by 2015
More unemployment and "NEETs": Unemployment for men 25-34 tripled from 2% in the 1980s to 6% in the 2000s, while those Not in Education, Employment or Training ("NEETs") also increased
Disrupted career paths: Each additional year spent in regular employment increases a man's chance of marriage by about 0.2 percentage points annually, but younger generations accumulate fewer of these stable years
The marriage market effect
Gender expectations amplify the impact of job insecurity:
Over 90% of unmarried women in Japan consider a man's income and earning potential important for marriage
Men in nonstandard jobs are 3 percentage points less likely to marry in any given year compared to those with regular employment
Unemployed men are 5.5 percentage points less likely to marry
Even men who eventually secure good jobs face a "scarring effect" from earlier periods of instability
Beyond marriage: Employment affects birth timing too
The research uncovered a surprising finding: employment problems delay childbirth even after marriage.
Among already-married men, employment instability accounts for 27% of the delay in having a first child across generations
This challenges the common belief that Japan's fertility decline is simply about fewer marriages
How the research worked — in plain terms
The study examined life histories of 2,507 Japanese men born between 1945-1984, tracking:
Their yearly employment status (regular job, nonstandard job, self-employment, or not working)
When they first married and had children
How these patterns changed across different generations
Rather than just showing correlations, the researcher created "what if" scenarios: What if men from recent generations had the same employment stability as their fathers and grandfathers? This approach revealed how much of the delay stems specifically from employment changes.
Some of my notes: It's not just about cultural shifts
While narratives about demographic decline often emphasize cultural shifts and changing values, this research from Japan adds to growing global evidence that concrete economic factors—particularly employment stability—play a substantial role in family formation decisions worldwide.
Japan's experience is especially instructive because it demonstrates these effects in a society with relatively stronger worker protections and lower cost of living compared to many of its neighbors. The fact that employment instability accounts for 45% of increased childlessness among men in this context suggests we're witnessing a fundamental relationship between economic security and family formation that masks itself using “culture”.
As similar patterns of delayed marriage and declining birth rates emerge across diverse societies—from Europe to Latin America to North America—Japan's case offers valuable insights, not an exotic exception. The connection between precarious employment and postponed families appears increasingly universal, challenging policymakers everywhere to address the economic foundations of demographic sustainability rather than focusing exclusively on cultural factors.
By understanding these dynamics as shared economic challenges rather than cultural peculiarities, societies can learn from each other's experiences while developing solutions appropriate to their specific contexts.